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FOLSOM V. MARSH AND ITS LEGACY
L. Ray Patterson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fair use doctrine has become so important in American
copyright law that it is somewhat surprising to learn that the case
credited with creating it, Folsom v. Marsh,' was so poorly reasoned
that it may be entitled to first place in the category of bad copy-
right decisions. The case was a bill in equity for copyright piracy,
the style of which comes from plaintiff, Folsom, Wells and Thurst-
on, printers and publishers, and defendants, Marsh, Capen and
Lyon, booksellers.2
If one of the characteristics of a bad legal decision is that it gives
rise to a myth as to what the court in fact ruled, Folsom is at the
top of the list. The myth is twofold. The first myth is that Folsom
created fair use, when in fact it merely redefined infringement.
The second myth is that Folsom diminished, and therefore fair use
diminishes, the rights of the copyright owner. In fact, the case
enlarged those rights beyond what arguably Congress could do in
light of the limitations on its copyright power3 and, indeed, fair use
today continues to be an engine for expanding the copyright
monopoly.
This is a large charge in light of the modern culture to the
contrary, but analysis bears it out, and one begins the analysis
with Folsom. The major factor in understanding Folsom is the
scope of copyright when the case was decided, because whether fair
use enlarged or diminished the rights of the copyright owner
depends upon what those rights were before the fair use doctrine
developed.
In 1840, the rights of copyright were available only for a book as
it was published; another author could abridge or translate the
book without infringing the copyright. Story, aware of both
* Pope Brock Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
'9 F. Cas. 342, (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901).
2 d.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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doctrines, acknowledged the abridgment doctrine in Folsom, and
held that the defendant's work was not an abridgment. He then
proceeded to redefine infringement, which in his hands became any
copying, duplicative or imitative, in whole or in part of the
copyrighted work. This redefinition of infringement enlarged the
copyright monopoly and became the basis for what was to become
fair use.
There would be, of course, an anomaly in being concerned with
a poorly reasoned judicial decision over a hundred years old, except
that its impact continues today in unsuspected ways. Prior to
Folsom, copyright could best be understood as a subset of public
domain law in the form of a limited statutory monopoly;4 Folsom
laid the groundwork for transforming copyright into a subset of
property law as a natural law right.5 Since the law of which
copyright is a subset is the source of copyright rules, the choice has
important consequences. Whether copyright is a statutory
monopoly or a proprietary right is significant for both copyright
owners and users of copyrighted material. The former concept
provides greater, the latter less, leeway for use by others, and this
issue has assumed a new importance in light of communications
technology by reason of which copyright holders'may be able to
control all access to copyrighted material, for example, in a
computer database. Before proceeding with the nature of copyright,
however, it will be useful to discuss the Folsom decision itself since
it is better known for its supposed holding than its content.
II. THE FACTS IN FOLSOM
The author's work alleged to have been infringed was Jared
Sparks' twelve-volume work, The Writings of George Washington,
being his correspondence, addresses, messages, and other papers,
official and private, selected and published from the original
manuscripts, with a life of the author, notes, and illustrations.6
The infringing work was the Rev. Charles Upham's two-volume
'Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
'The best example of this is the development of the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine, a natural
law concept, that the U.S. Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991).
'Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 343 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901).
[Vol. 5:431432
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work entitled The Life of Washington in the Form of An Autobiogra-
phy, the narrative being to a great extent conducted by himself, in
extracts and selections from his own writings, with portraits and
other engravings.7
Sparks' work consisted of 6,763 pages,8 Upham's work of 866
pages,9 353 of which were copied verbatim from Sparks' work."0
Of these 353 pages, 34 had appeared in various other publications,
319 had never appeared in print." Of the 319 pages, 64 pages
were official documents and 255 pages were private. 2 Thus,
omitting the official documents, Upham copied 255 of 6,763 pages,
approximately 3.8 percent. (Upham did not copy the Sparks'
biography of Washington, the first of the twelve volumes, and the
only original writing of the twelve volumes.)
The defendants argued three points, 3 the most important of
which was that the papers were public in nature, and, therefore,
not private property; that Sparks was not the owner of these
papers, which belonged to the United States, and could be pub-
lished by anyone; and an author has a right to quote, select, extract
or abridge another work in the composition of a work essentially
new.
III. THE REASONING IN FOLSOM
Story's most interesting comment occurs at the beginning of the
opinion where he bemoaned the difficulty of deciding the case with
7Id.
I ld. at 344.
Id.
10 Id. at 343 (Note that on p. 344, the court gives the total number of copied pages to be
388).
1 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
I. The papers of George Washington are not subjects of copyright.
1. They are manuscripts of a deceased person, not injured by publication
of them.
2. They are not literary, and, therefore, are not literary property.
3. They are public in nature, and, therefore, not private property.
4. They were meant by the author for public use.
II. Mr. Sparks is not the owner of these papers, but they belong to the United
States, and may be published by any one.
Ill. An author has a right to quote, select, extract or abridge another in the
composition of a work essentially new.
1998] 433
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his famous comment that "[platents and copyrights approach,
nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discus-
sions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the
distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, and,
sometimes, almost evanescent."14
This comment was either a confession of ignorance or the
expression of a desire to change the law, and given Story's emi-
nence, we can assume he had a commensurate ego and that it was
the latter. His comment that the question of piracy often depends
"upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the
materials of the other" 5 is not wholly consistent with the fact that
one could translate or abridge a copyrighted work without infring-
ing it and indicates that his motive was to change the legal
definition of infringement or piracy, as he called it. For he then
used the logically dubious example of a reviewer who "may fairly
cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly
to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable
criticism."" But if he "cites the most important parts of the work,
with a view, not to criticise but to supersede the use of the original
work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed
in law a piracy.""7 The reviewer example is logically inapt, but
apparently Story found it in English precedent and it was more
useful for its inference than reliable for its logic: If a reviewer is
limited in the use of the work for review, others are even more
limited in the use of the work for other purposes.
Story then moved to the question of abridgment, conceding that
"it has been decided that a fair and bona fide abridgment of an
original work, is not a piracy of the copyright of the author.""8 He
concluded that defendant's work was not an abridgment, but his
reasoning was unpersuasive. First, he said that Upham's work
is formed upon a plan different from that of Mr.
Sparks, and in which Washington is made mainly to
tell the story of his own life, by inserting therein his
14 Id. at 344.
'I Id.
16 Id.
'7 Id. at 344-45.
18 Id. at 345.
434 [Vol. 5:431
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letters and his messages, and other written docu-
ments, with such connecting lines in the narrative,
as may illustrate and explain the times and circum-
stances, and occasions of writing them.19
This conclusion, of course, requires a very narrow meaning of
abridgment, a means of limiting-as a step to eradicating-the
doctrine, which apparently was honored more in the breach than
the observance.2" If one can abridge an entire work, it would
seem that the use of less than the entire work to create a new one
that entailed intellectual effort would qualify.
Moreover, the fact that one third of the infringing defendant's
two volumes was "identical with the passages in Mr. Sparks's
work,"21 was consistent with abridgment, but its relevance to
infringement was analytically remote. The amount of the material
defendant takes from plaintiffs work determines infringement as
a matter of law, but the amount that benefits defendant determines
unjust enrichment as a matter of equity. We can assume, then,
that Story viewed infringement as unjust enrichment-a doctrine
of equity that was the subject of his Commentaries-and felt that
a defendant was not entitled to a free ride in using another's
copyrighted material.22
Story then addressed the defendants' objections, dealing first
with the objection that the materials "were designed by the author
19 ld
20 See EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (DRONE ON COPYRIGHT) 437
(Rothman Reprints Inc. 1972) (1879) (The leading 18th century copyright Treatise defining
fair use as the right of one author to use the works of another author in creating his or her
own work).
21 9 F. Cas. at 345.
' Story's view is made clear in the following passage from his Commentaries. "In cases
of the invasion of a copy-right by using the same materials in another work, of which a large
proportion is original, it constitutes no objection, that an injunction will in effect stop the sale
and circulation of the work which so infringes upon the copyright. If the parts, which are
original cannot be separated from those, which are not original, without destroying the use
and value of the original matter, he, who has made the improper use of that which did not
belong to him, must suffer the consequences of so doing." II JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 942 at 131 (12th
ed. 1877). This, of course, is pure natural law reasoning.
1998] 435
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for public use, and not for copyright, or private property."" To
this defense, Story said that "President Washington deemed them
his own private property, and bequeathed them to his nephew, the
late Mr. Justice Washington.. .24 How President Washington's
self-serving actions could be determinative of the legal status of his
papers is not clear, but we have here a personal ulterior motive
that was congruent with the jurisprudential motive of enlarging the
author's rights. Chief Justice Marshall and Sparks acquired the
interest of Bushrod Washington, and "the publication of these
writings was undertaken by Mr. Sparks, as editor, for their joint
benefit;" from which it followed that "[tihe publication of the
defendants,... to some extent, must be injurious to the rights of
property of the representatives and assignees of President Wash-
ington."'
This was a curious argument in view of the fact that "congress
have actually purchased these very letters and manuscripts, at a
great price, for the benefit of the nation, from their owner and
possessor under the will of Mr. Justice Washington, as private and
most valuable property."26 Thus using as evidence the conduct of
the former President's legatee, Story concluded that the former
President did not intend the papers exclusively for public use and
held that the author of private letters and papers "has a property
therein, and that the copyright thereof exclusively belongs to
him."27 But at that time the author of private letters could have
no copyright until he or she published them and complied with the
provisions of the copyright statute. The author of unpublished
works had only a common law copyright.28
Story thus disregarded the distinction between the common law
copyright and the statutory copyright, the former being only the
exclusive right of first publication, the latter the right of continued
and exclusive publication. The relevance of this point is that the
common law copyright is a natural law right that is cut off by
publication. By ignoring the distinction, Story was able to construe
s 9 F. Cas. at 345.
2
Ald.
2Id.
26id.
27 Id. at 346.
2 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (KB. 1774).
436 [Vol. 5:431
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section 9 of the 1831 Copyright Act, with some semblance of reason,
to support his position "that the author of any letter or letters (and
his representatives) ... possess the sole and exclusive copyright
therein."29 Section 9 provided a remedy against a person who
published a manuscript without the author's consent. Story said
that it "gives by implication to the author, or legal proprietor of any
manuscript whatever, the sole right to print and publish the same,
and expressly authorizes the courts of equity of the United States
to grant injunctions to restrain the publication thereof, by any
person or persons, without his consent."30
The key words are "by implication," which indicate some sleight-
of-hand reasoning. While the subject of section 9 was "any
manuscript whatever," the term manuscript must have meant a
composition written for publication rather than any document that
might be written by hand, which in 1840, presumably, included all
documents. But Story's reference to "the sole right to print and
publish" implies protection for continued publication.
What Story chose to ignore was that logically the section
protected only the author's right of first publication of his or her
manuscript, for the author's right of continued publication was the
function of statutory copyright. If another published a manuscript
without permission, the author could get an injunction to stop the
publication. But if the author himself or herself desired to publish
the manuscript, he or she would have to comply with the terms of
the copyright statute or the work would go into the public domain.
As to official letters, Story equivocated, saying that it may be
doubtful that any public official could publish them without the
9 F. Cas. at 346.
'°Id. at 347. The provisions of section 9, based section 6 of the 1790 Act, read as follows:
"And be it further enacted, That any persons or persons who shall print
or publish any manuscript whatever without the consent of the author
or legal proprietor first obtained as aforesaid, (if such author or
proprietor be a citizen of the United States, or resident therein,) shall be
liable to suffer and pay to the author or proprietor, all damages
occasioned by such irjury...; and the several courts of the United States
empowered to grant injunctions to prevent the violation of the rights of
authors and inventors, are hereby empowered to grant injunctions, in
like manner, according to the principles of equity, to restrain such
publication of any manuscript as aforesaid."
Law of Feb. 3, 1831, § 9.
1998] 437
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sanction of the government, at least when secrecy may be required.
He also said that it may be the duty of the government to publish
such papers, but this did not give private persons the right to
publish them. He concluded, however, that it was not necessary to
dispose of the point in this case "because, of the letters and
documents published by the defendants, not more than one fifth
part are of an official character."3 This was a curious conclusion
since it meant that uncopyrightable material could have copyright
protection merely because it was contained in a copyrighted work;
even so the conclusion was consistent with his natural law
philosophy, as he explained it in his Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence .32
Story rejected the defendants' argument that because Congress
had purchased the manuscripts of the letters and documents for
"the liberal price of 25,000 dollars,"33 they had become public
property that could be published by anyone. This was an entirely
inadmissible conclusion, he said, for if this were so, "every private
person had an equal right to use any other national property at his
pleasure, such as the arms, the ammunition, the ships, or the
custom houses, belonging to the government."'
The analogy is faulty because it compares physical objects and
intangible rights. The proper analogy requires the same type
physical objects, for example, ships and books (finished products)
or the drawings for ships and manuscripts for books (material for
creating the finished products). The fact that one cannot use the
ships or books owned by the government does not of itself mean
that one cannot build a similar ship or reprint the books, for there
is a distinction between the use of physical objects and the exercise
of an intangible right.
Story's error, in short, was that he failed to distinguish the
copyright of a work and the physical object in which the work is
fixed. The irony is that Story used this distinction when he
justified his conclusion by saying that "the government purchased
the manuscripts, subject to the copyright already acquired by the
3' 9 F. Cas. at 347.
32 STORY, supra note 22.
3 9 F. Cas. at 347.
34 Id.
[Vol. 5:431438
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plaintiffs in the publication thereof."" Thus, the government had,
the manuscripts and the plaintiffs the copyright.
As to defendants' right to abridge the materials, Story said that
this "is the real hinge of the whole controversy, and involves the
entire merits of the suit."3 Having already concluded that "the
defendants' work cannot properly be treated as an abridgment of
that of the plaintiffs; ...,,,3 he moved on to the issue of whether
"this is a justifiable use of the original materials, such as the law
recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs."38
The passage that is the source of the fair use doctrine is thus a
passage about copyright infringement, which, in light of the
abridgment and translation doctrines, he enlarged. "It is certainly
not necessary," he said, "to constitute an invasion of copyright, that
the whole of a work should be copied, or even a large portion of it,
in form or in substance."39 Thus, Story's definition of infringe-
ment was copying in whole or in part, by duplication or imitation.
The test is harm to the original work, as shown by his comment, "If
so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly dimin-
ished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an
injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in point
of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. ° This followed from the
fact that copyright is the property of the author. "The entirety of
the copyright is the property of the author; and it is no defence,
that another person has appropriated a part, and not the whole, of
any property." 4 And the harm does not "necessarily depend upon
the quantity taken, whether it is an infringement of the copyright
or not"42 and other factors are to be considered. "It is often
affected by other considerations, the value of the materials taken,
and the importance of it to the sale of the original work. . .."
The harm was to be determined by factors such as "the nature and
35 id.
36Id.
37 Id.
3
8 Id. at 348.
39Id.
40 1Id.
41Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 348.
1998] 439
9
Patterson: Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the
sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the
original work."
4
Quoting an English case, Story revealed his natural law bias
(committing what the U.S. Supreme Court in Feist was to deter-
mine to be constitutional error) when he said" 'None are entitled
to save themselves trouble and expense, by availing themselves, for
their own profit, of other men's works, still entitled to the protec-
tion of copyright.' "4
The theory of unjust enrichment thus explains why Story
concluded that there was an invasion of plaintiffs copyright, not so
much because of harm to plaintiff as of value to defendant.
[E]very one must see, that the work of the defen-
dants is mainly founded upon these letters, constitut-
ing more than one third of their work, and imparting
to it its greatest, nay, its essential value. Without
those letters, in its present form the work must fall
to the ground .... It seems to me, therefore, that it
is a clear invasion of the right of property of the
plaintiffs, if the copying or parts of a work, not
constituting a major part, can ever be a violation
thereof, as upon principle and authority, I have no
doubt it may be. If it had been the case of fair and
bona fide abridgment of the work of the plaintiffs, it
might have admitted of a very different consider-
ation.4 '
The opinion thus concludes with a natural law coda.
"Id.
Id. at 349 (quoting Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Jur. (London) 127 [3 Jur. 6691, 2 Beav. 6).
"Id. at 349.
440 [Vol. 5:431
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IV. THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF FOLSOM
The legal context of Folsom was copyright as a limited statutory
grant. The relevant statute, the 1831 Copyright Act,47 gave the
copyright holder "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, and vending" the copyrighted work."8 One committed
an infringement of a book by doing or causing, one of three acts:
printing, publishing, or importing the work without the permission
of the copyright holder.49 The statutory language thus does not
support Story's view that infringement includes the copying of a
portion (even a small portion) of a copyrighted work either in form
or substance. Moreover, these rights were limited to citizens and
residents of the U.S.,50 evidence that Congress, at least, did not
consider copyright to be a natural law right, which, indeed, it could
not be since copyright did not protect the work in manuscript, as a
natural law copyright would do. Thus, the copyright protected the
book only as it was published. Moreover, unlike the infringement
of books, the infringement of prints, engravings, maps, charts, and
musical compositions included the act of copying them.51
The difference between printing and copying as infringement is
best demonstrated by the concept of piracy, a sin of the publisher,
and plagiarism, a sin of the author. Piracy is the publishing of a
copyrighted work without permission but with the author's name.
Plagiarism is the copying a work, in whole or part, without
permission and taking the copied material as one's own. Plagia-
rism, of course, does not require a copyright, for the conduct and
effect are the same whether or not the copied material is protected
by copyright. Thus, protection from piracy is a matter of the
copyright statute and protection from plagiarism is a matter of
common law.
Under the 1831 Copyright Revision Act, copyright was a limited
statutory grant as in the 1790 Act which was a copy of the first
English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,52 which had
47 4 Stat. 436-39.
4 § 6.
50 § 8.
:'§ 7.
2 Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710).
19981 441
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changed the early private law copyright in England-which was in
fact a natural law copyright-to a limited statutory monopoly. And
only three years after the 1831 Revision Act was enacted, the U.S.
Supreme Court confirmed the statutory monopoly theory of
copyright in Wheaton v. Peters.3 While bound by Wheaton, Story
ignored it, but Folsom should be considered in light of the Supreme
Court decision.
The issue in Wheaton was whether Peters, who had succeeded
Wheaton as Supreme Court reporter, infringed Wheaton's reports
of Supreme Court cases in publishing his "condensed" reports.
Since there was a question as to whether Wheaton had complied
with the copyright statute, the parties argued and the Court
considered whether an author was entitled to a common law
copyright based on the natural law in addition to the statutory
copyright. In practical terms, the issue was whether copyright is
a common law right under the natural law or only a statutory grant
created by Congress, for if copyright were a common law right, the
statutory grant would be superfluous.
Since the two theories-natural law and statutory monopo-
ly-were fully argued and considered in Wheaton when Story was
a member of the Court, he must have been familiar with them and
conscious of the fact that the Court had rejected the natural law
theory in favor of the statutory monopoly theory. Against this
background, one is justified in concluding that Story's use of
natural law copyright ideas in deciding Folsom is a classic case of
intellectual dishonesty, and that the Wheaton case was one of his
targets.
The best evidence of this is the holding that the assignees of
papers, public and private, of a former President of the United
States, from a legatee of the former President was entitled to
copyright for publishing the papers, although the assignor had sold
the papers to the United States Government. To reach this result,
Story used a natural law concept, the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine,
that the U.S. Supreme Court has since held to be unconstitution-
al.' 4
83 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
54 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
[Vol. 5:431442
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V. THE LEGAL SOURCE OF COPYRIGHT
Because Wheaton rejected the common law copyright derived
from natural law and affirmed the statutory monopoly copyright,
it will be useful to consider the legal source for each copyright:
property law for the unlimited natural law copyright, and public
domain law for the statutory monopoly copyright.
The traditional view is that copyright, whatever its jurispruden-
tial basis, is a property right, and thus a subset of property law.
The argument here is that this view is in error and that copyright
is best seen as a special kind of property created from public
domain materials and is thus best treated as a subset of public
domain law. The importance of the point, of course, is that
copyright is ultimately governed by the rules derived from its
source, property rules or public domain rules.
Preliminarily, it is useful to note that Story, who treated
copyright as a subset of property law, explained why copyright is
in fact a subset of public domain law in Emerson v. Davies, only
four years after Folsom when he said:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there
are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an
abstract sense, are strictly new and original through-
out. Every book in literature, science and art,
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much
which was well known and used before. No man
creates a new language for himself, at least if he be
a wise man, in writing a book. He contents himself
with the use of language already known and used
and understood by others .... The thoughts of every
man are, more or less, a combination of what other
men have thought and expressed, although they may
be modified, exalted or improved by his own genius
or reflection. If no book could be the subject of copy-
right which was not new and original in the ele-
ments of which it is composed, there could be no
ground for any copy-right in modern times,..."
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (1845). But here, as in Folsom, Story had an
ulterior motive. In Emerson the ulterior motive was to justify copyright for compilations of
public domain material.
19981 443
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This passage tells us that all works are necessarily composed of
materials taken from the public domain, which must be protected
lest it be exhausted by too many natural law copyrights that,
unlike the statutory monopoly copyright, have no boundaries.
Natural law copyright begins when a work is created and presum-
ably extends beyond the author's death to infinity, since there is no
measure for its termination.
The most obvious example showing that one of the purposes of
copyright is to protect the public domain is that the copyright
statute excludes ideas from copyright protection. While we cannot
know, we can guess that except for the copyright statute, courts
would long ago have given common law protection to ideas. Thus,
copyright as a subset of public domain law protects the public
domain, just as copyright as a subset of property law protects
property.
The major obstacle to viewing copyright as a subset of public
domain law is that the law of the public domain is underdeveloped;
however, the reason for this shows its importance. The reason is
that public domain law is hidden in the law of free speech, a
conclusion that is not as novel as it may seem to be. The public
domain designates material owned by everyone and thus by no one,
and a moment's reflection will show that freedom of speech depends
in a large measure upon the existence of a public domain.
The relationship of the public domain to free speech has a
historical, as well as a logical, base. In England there was no
public domain during the reign of press control when copyright
served as a device of censorship because of the religious controversy
that Henry VIII precipitated by his break with Rome.6 A mon-
arch concerned for his crown is not disposed to allow a free press
that might attempt to persuade the people to favor a monarch of a
different religion. At least, Mary the Catholic, Elizabeth I the
Protestant, James I, perhaps a closet Catholic, certainly Charles I,
who lost his head over religion, the libertine Charles II, and James
II, who lost his crown for preferring Catholicism, were not so
disposed. They attempted to control the output of the press and it
was not coincidental that a few years after the Glorious Revolution
"See LYAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 114-42 (1968)
(discussing the Star Chamber Decree of 1586 and 1637 and the Licensing Act of 1662).
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assured Protestant succession to the throne, the public domain was
created by the demise of censorship legislation which was the only
legal support for copyright.57 When the first copyright statute was
enacted in 1710,58 it was designed so that it protected the newly
created public domain; copyright was for original writings that
were published and lasted only a limited time. These conditions
meant that copyright could not be used to capture public domain
material and the protected works would go into the public domain
after a relatively short term.
As the reasons for, and thus the source of, the First Amendment
and the copyright clause of the U. S. Constitution, the religious
controversy in England is historical evidence that the former
requires the public domain and the latter protects it. The single
most persuasive item of evidence of the correlation is the fact that
the title of the Statute of Anne-the English remedy for the natural
law copyright that had served the cause of monopoly and censor-
ship so well-was the source of the language for the copyright
clause. 9 The lesson the framers learned was that the natural law
proprietary copyright prevented the development of the public
domain and its return would undermine, if not destroy what its
demise created. This explains why in 1841, the constitutional
principle of copyright was that one is entitled to only a limited
monopoly of material taken from the public domain and then only
if its use benefits society.
This principle alone requires that copyright be a subset of public
domain law, but Congress, with the aid of lobbying from the
copyright industry, has ignored this point and made legislative
" The Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, cl. 33 C1662) (making publication of a work
protected by copyright to be as much of an offense against the act as publishing a work
without the licenser's imprimatur). The Act constrained sunset provisions, but was renewed
from time to time, the last time for two years. The statute was allowed to lapse in 1694.
' The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, cl. 19 (1710).
The title of the Statute of Anne read: "An act for the encouragement of learning, by
vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned." Id. The copyright clause reads: "The Congress shall have Power
... To promote the Progress of Science and use Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright clause is italicized to distinguish it from the patent clause.
The most significant point about the clause is that it is a limitation on as well as a grant
of congressional power.
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changes to defeat it. Copyright has ceased to be subject to the
conditions of publication, notice, deposit and registration, has been
given an extended term, and protects against plagiarism as well as
piracy. Indeed, the protection against plagiarism may be the most
important factor in the change, for it was the first and prepared the
way for the other. Story's goal in Folsom was not for the fair use
doctrine, but protection for the author against plagiarism.
Plagiarism implies ownership of the work, the basic tenet, although
unarticulated, of the natural law copyright and Story's need for
copyright to protect against plagiarism as well as piracy gave him
both his conviction for the need, and the basis for, a change in the
law that was to have global consequences in the world of copyright
law.
VI. FoLsOM's CHANGE OF COPYRIGHT
Story's expansion of infringement to include plagiarism is one key
to understanding Folsom and the fair use doctrine. Plagiarism is
a natural law doctrine that implies the author's writings are his or
her property and thus that copyright is a subset of property law as
a natural law property right.
The natural law copyright, however, can be described as being
trite and banal; trite because there is only one condition for it to
come into existence (the creation of a work), and banal because the
only interest protected is that of the author (since the function of
property law is to protect the property owner). The two character-
istics mean that the public interest is only an incidental beneficiary
of the natural law copyright. The best evidence of these points is
in the legacy of Folsom, as found in the in modem fair use
decisions, which are just as logically dubious as their nineteenth
century progenitor.
Three fair use decisions-Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corp.,' Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Servs.,
Inc., 1 and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc."2-illus-
trate the point. In Kinko's and Princeton Univ. Press, the courts
758 F. Supp. 1522, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
61 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
62 37 F.3d 881, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (2d Cir. 1994).
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limited the right of professors and students to use photocopies of
excerpts from copyrighted works made by a commercial copyshop,
although the professor chose the excerpts and requested the copies.
The courts simply read out of the statute the language "multiple
copies for classroom use," using the novel solution of attributing to
the principal a duty of the agent that destroys the principal's stated
statutory right.63 In Texaco, the court limited the right to engage
in uninhibited use of published material for research, holding that
a subscriber who paid $2400 a year for three subscriptions to a
learned journal must pay a license fee in order for an employee
scientist to copy an article from the journal for research purpos-
es.' The reasoning in this case measures up to that in Kinko's
and Princeton University Press for intellectual dishonesty. The
subscriber was a for-profit corporation that spent $87,000,000 a
year on research, which somehow meant that the subscriber was
using the journal with a profit motive.'
Arguably, the faulty reasoning in both cases rivals, and may even
be superior to, that of Story in Folsom. The 1831 Copyright Act did
not specifically say that the papers of a former President purchased
by the United States could not be copyrighted by the assignees of
the President's legatee. The 1976 Act does say that "the fair use of
a copyrighted work,... for purposes such as ... teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright.""
Thus, modern courts continue to use the concept of fair use taken
from Folsom to expand the copyright monopoly. The difference is
that while Folsom enlarged a very narrow copyright, the modern
cases enlarge a very broad copyright. Thus Folsom limited an
author's right to use a copyrighted work, which respected the
market boundary for copyright; indeed, the Folsom test was
centered on the market impact of the competitive use. The modern
view, promoted by copyright owners, is that the fair use doctrine
limits the right of individuals to use a copyrighted work for their
personal purposes regardless of market impact.
See Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. 1522; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d 1381.
See Texaco, 37 F.3d 881.
"Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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VII. THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF FOLSOM
We now come to the main point. The fair use doctrine as created
benefitted authors in two respects: it enhanced the right to publish
and protected the right to create works.67 Contemporary fair use
adds a third benefit for the author or copyright owner: it protects
the right to license the use of a copy of a work after that copy has
been sold. Thus, if as a matter of fair use a teacher can copy only
1000 words from a prose work," if he or she copies 1,050 words,
he or she is guilty of infringement. To avoid infringement, the
teacher must get permission from the copyright owner, and the
copyright owner can require a licensing fee as a condition for
permission.
This result is possible only if fair use is an excused infringement
and only if it encompasses personal use by individuals as well as
competitive use by authors. The idea that fair use is an excused
infringement is a product of Folsom in which Story merely
redefined infringement, a redefinition that resulted in what came
to be known as the fair use doctrine.
How fair use, which was clearly required only of competing
authors, came to encompass personal use is a story too complex to
report in detail and I report it in summary fashion. There are
three points. First, until the 1909 Copyright Act, the copyright
owner of a book had only the right to print, reprint, publish, and
vend the book, but the copyright owner of a work of art also had
the right to copy it.69 All prior copyright statutes had adhered to
7 So long as another could abridge or translate a work, the exclusive right to publish was
very narrow; and unless an author could use another's work to create his or her own, the
creative process was fraught with peril.
" This is the amount prescribed in the Copyright Act, Agreement on Guidelines for
Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions, H. REP. No. 94-1476 at 68
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5682, which is merely a part of the legislative
history not a provision of the Copyright Act; the problem is, it is not law.
' The 1790 Act granted the rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" the
copyrighted work, sec. 1, but it was an infringement "to print, reprint, publish, or import"
the copyrighted work. 1 Stat. 124-26, §§ 1-2 (1790).
The 1802 Amendment provided copyright protection for engravings and prints. 2 Stat.
171-72 (1802). The grant of rights section provided that the copyright owner had the right
"of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending" the prints. § 2. But it was an infringement
for another "to engrave, etch or work,. . . or in any other manner copy or sell .... or import
for sale..." the copyrighted work. § 3.
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this dichotomy-the right to print books and the right to copy to
works of art-but the 1909 Act provided that the rights to print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend applied to all copyrighted works.
The significance of the change as applied to books is seen in the
fact that the right to publish a book applies to the whole book,
while the right to copy a book applies to copying the book in whole
or in part.
Second, in the 1976 Act, Congress gave the copyright owner the
right to reproduce the work in copies and, as a separate right, to
distribute copies to the public. The effect was to divide the act of
publication-printing and public distribution-into two separate
rights. The right to copy a book as a separate right is the basis for
the claim that to copy any portion of the book is infringement,
which, in turn, is the basis for the copyright holder's claim of the
right to license the use of books on the library shelf.
Third, the separation of the right of publication into two steps
limited only by fair use inevitably meant the extension of the
defense of fair use-originally available only to authors-to
individual users. The benefit was one that the user could well do
without, for, as the Classroom Guidelines show, it resulted in a
The 1831 Revision Act granted the rights "of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending"
the copyrighted work. 4 Stat. 436-39 (1831). The infringement of books was to "print,
publish, or import ... any copy of such book, or books, without the consent of the person
legally entitled to the copyright thereof.. ." § 6. But the infringement of "any print, cut, or
engraving, map, chart or musical composition" was to "engrave, etch, or work, sell, or copy
... or import for sale..." § 7.
The 1870 Revision Act granted for "any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition,
engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo,
statue, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be perfected as works of fine arts...
the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing,
and vending the same;..." 16 Stat. 212-17, § 86 (1870). The infringement of books was to
"print, publish, or import, or,. . . sell. . ." § 99. For "any map, chart, musical compositions,
print, cut, engraving, or photograph, or chromo, or... painting, drawing, statue, statuary,
or model or design intended to be perfected and executed as a work of the fine arts" it was
an infringement to "engrave, etch, work, copy, print, publish, or import" the work. § 100.
The 1909 Revision Act granted the copyright owner the right "To print, reprint, publish,
copy, and vend the copyrighted work;" § 1(a). The 1909 Act neither distinguished the
infringement of various works nor defined infringement, providing only "That if any person
shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United
States such person shall be liable: .. ." § 25.
Note that the 1870 revision act was reenacted in 1873 as Part of the Revised Statutes,
Title 60; and the 1909 Act was later codified as Title 17 of the U.S. Code.
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definition of fair use and a defined right is a limited right.
There must be an explanation of why Congress failed to under-
stand the changes it made in the 1976 Act and why courts have
consistently failed to understand that fair use was intended to be
required only of competing authors, not individuals. The explana-
tion for Congress' failure is simple: Congress allowed the copyright
industry to draft the Copyright Act.70 Also, the lobbyists for the
industry knew exactly what they were doing-providing a statutory
base for a natural law copyright in deed if not word. For example,
the copyrightists claimed that the common law copyright under
state law and the statutory copyright under federal law resulted in
a needless and confusing dual system of copyright protection The
argument, of course, was wrong because the common law copyright
was not a copyright at all, only the right of first publication. As the
saying goes: when statutory copyright came in, common law
copyright went out. There was, in short, no system of dual
copyright protection. But getting rid of the common law copyright
was necessary to grant statutory copyright from the moment of
fixation, which is to say creation, a characteristic of natural law.7'
The explanation for the judicial failing is more subtle and
complex. We start with the point that few judges know very much
about copyright law, which, until recently, was a backwater subject
in law school. Consequently, judges are amenable to the claims of
copyright lawyers that copyright is a plenary property right and
that another's use of a copyrighted work without permission is
unfair. Since property is the basis of the common law system,
judges see no reason to reject the copyrightists' claim, a tradition
that goes straight back to Story.
The question of whether copyright is a natural law property right
or statutory monopoly is a question of how shall we treat copyright
law. This is a policy question and there are arguments to support
either choice. European countries, for example, use the natural law
theory of copyright, the Anglo-American tradition has been the
70 See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 857 (1987) (discussing the history and development of the 1976 Act).
"' Fixation rather than creation was the requirement because under the Constitution,
Congress can provide copyright only for "writings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Therefore,
even though created, work had to be fixed before Congress could grant it copyright
protection.
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statutory monopoly theory. The policy choice in the U.S., however,
is not open to change easily, because it was made in 1787 and put
into the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, there is a good argument that
in the 1976 Copyright Act Congress came perilously close to
enacting an unconstitutional statute and avoided this error only by
including the fair use doctrine.
The judicial branch, however, has committed the sin that the
legislative branch narrowly avoided. Courts, by and large, have
given fair use, part of a statute granting a statutory monopoly, a
natural law interpretation. In jurisprudential terms, the legal sin
is to use a theory in administering the statute that differs from the
theory used in drafting and enacting the statute. There is much
evidence of this error, but our main concern is the fair use doctrine
where, perhaps, the error exists in its most egregious form.
Fair use is a derivative concept, derived from the concept of
copyright of which it is a part. If copyright is a natural law right,
fair use is a natural law concept, an excused infringement and a
defense. If copyright is a statutory monopoly, fair use should be
viewed as a limitation on the monopoly in the public interest,
which means that it is an affirmative right, not excused infringe-
ment. The paradox is that while U.S. copyright is a statutory
monopoly copyright, fair use is treated as a natural law right to
protect that monopoly.
The folly of a natural law fair use in administering a statutory
monopoly copyright is shown by the extension of fair use to
encompass personal use by individuals. First, except for the fact
that fair use is treated as a natural law concept, it would not have
been extended to individual use. Second, while fair use is denoted
a defense, it is in fact a requirement. Thus, to use a copyrighted
work a person must fulfill certain requirements to avoid infringing
the work. Perhaps this makes sense when a competing author is
making use of another's work; but it makes a mockery of the
constitutional purpose of copyright-the promotion of learn-
ing-when an individual is using a copy of the work for study,
research, or scholarship.
Folsom's legacy is that it made the claim that copyright is a
natural law property right a part of copyright culture. But the
harm of the legacy has not been realized. That harm is that
copyright has come to represent a conflict between two fundamen-
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tal policies of our society: property rights and free speech rights.
The paradox here is that both rights are natural law rights and
natural rights, by definition, should not conflict.
Thus, we need to reorient our thinking about copyright and fair
use. Joseph Story was, no doubt, an honorable and decent man of
high intelligence, but his service to the cause ofjurisprudence must
be downgraded by reason of his treatment of copyright. No doubt
he was sincere, but he was also human, and the evidence is that he
reshaped the concept of copyright infringement not for the public's
interest, but his own. He was, after all, an author himself and the
garret was not to him a desirable place to live. And it may be that,
being an author of legal treatises, he viewed copyright as a muse.
After all, to paraphrase Dr. Johnson, no one but a blockhead would
write a legal treatise except for money.
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